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a b s t r a c t 
We investigate the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices of 
domestic Vietnamese ﬁrms and their engagement with foreign markets. We develop a 
measure of CSR that combines compliance with labour standards, management commit- 
ment to CSR, and corporate community related actions; and ﬁnd a strong relationship be- 
tween this measure and participation in international markets. Results suggest that both 
exporting and importing ﬁrms engage in more CSR activities. Conditional on exporting, we 
show that Vietnamese exporters to China are less involved in CSR related activities, and 
that exporters to the US engage in more community related CSR. This may reﬂect differ- 
ences in stakeholder preferences across markets. 
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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 1. Introduction 
The interest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) has grown rapidly in recent years in response to globalisation, limi-
tations in government regulations and an increasing focus in civil society and the media on the ethical, social, and environ-
mental aspects of business operations ( Bénabou and Tirole, 2010 ). Firms have recognised that their conduct in purchasing
and supply-chain management may have signiﬁcant reputational and performance effects ( Castka and Balzarova, 2008 ). To
be sure, CSR can be used to enhance the image of ﬁrms and to attract consumers willing to pay for ethical attributes ( Besley
and Ghatak, 2007 ); and more responsible corporate behaviour reduces business risks including the threat of activist and con-
sumer boycotts ( Vogel, 2005 ). Apart from such outside considerations, CSR activities can be driven by internal motives; that
is, manager or shareholder preferences for advancing broader social interests ( Bénabou and Tirole, 2010 ). 
In this study, we address externally driven motivations for CSR emerging from interactions between domestic ﬁrms and
foreign stakeholders, such as consumers, foreign buyers of intermediate inputs and intermediate input suppliers. Our aim is
to explore empirically the direct impact of trade on CSR practices of domestic ﬁrms in Vietnam. Domestic ﬁrms may observe
and copy corporate social behaviour of export ﬁrms in export-intensive sectors in anticipation of entering export markets in
the future. In addition, they may respond to increased competition from imports by imitating the standards of production∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: cnewman@tcd.ie (C. Newman), john.rand@ku.dk (J. Rand), Finn@wider.unu.edu (F. Tarp), neda.trifkovic@econ.ku.dk (N. Trifkovic). 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.10.013 
0014-2921/© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
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 of the imported goods, on the one hand, or by pursuing cost-reducing investments in CSR, on the other hand. As ﬁrms enter
foreign markets (or start importing), they encounter preferences of new stakeholders, including foreign customers, both ﬁnal
consumers and buyers of intermediate inputs (or suppliers) and governments, which can affect their CSR activities. As CSR
activities depend on the intensiveness of stakeholder pressures ( Perez-Batres et al . , 2010 ), the effect of trade on CSR may
operate as well through the intensive margin – arising only after a threshold level of involvement with foreign stakeholders
has been achieved. 
CSR is deﬁned here as a mix of legally compliant and philanthropic activities and we separate them to be in accordance
with the different deﬁnitions of CSR commonly used. We measure CSR practices through (i) the extent to which the ﬁrm
complies with labour standards, (ii) the management commitment to acting beyond the regulatory scope as reﬂected in the
CSR strategy, and (iii) the engagement in community-based activities not directly linked to ﬁrm operations. These indicators
are used to generate a CSR index that captures the overall level of CSR activities a ﬁrm engages in. 
To determine the extent to which trade directly affects CSR, we examine whether ﬁrms that begin to trade in interna-
tional markets change the nature and extent of their corporate social behaviour. We also consider the effect of trade at the
intensive margin and examine the extent to which the effects are different for exports to and imports from different coun-
tries. One expects heterogeneity in the effect of trade on CSR, corresponding to the destination of exports or source country
of imports if there is, for example, variability in stakeholder preferences across countries. Indirect effects are captured by
analysing the extent to which the intensity of imports and exports into a sector affect the CSR activities of ﬁrms. 
Our paper adds to the literature (reviewed in Section 2 ) by examining whether the transmission of CSR practices is an
additional potential source of gain from global engagement. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on the adoption of
CSR, 1 which has, to our knowledge, not to date considered explicitly the transfer of CSR practices from foreign markets to
domestic ﬁrms. 
CSR was introduced to Vietnam through codes of conduct requested by customers in foreign markets or multi-national
companies ( Nguyen, 2007 ). The Global Compact Network Vietnam was launched in 2007 in a joint effort between the United
Nations, the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation, and Unilever
Vietnam, motivating Vietnamese companies to pursue a set of core values in the areas of human rights, labour standards, the
environment, and anti-corruption ( UN, 2014 ). Furthermore, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
is engaged in enhancing the sustainable integration of Vietnamese small and medium enterprises into global supply chains
through increased awareness, understanding, and adoption of CSR ( UNIDO, 2011 ). 2 These initiatives followed wide-ranging
reforms to enterprise, commercial and investment laws during the last decade. They have helped open the Vietnamese
economy and give increased access to foreign markets for domestic ﬁrms. The reforms culminated in accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007, contributing to the changing landscape for industrial development and increased trading
opportunities. 
Our key result is that exporting output and importing inputs has a positive impact on CSR activities, especially in terms of
adherence to labour standards. Export ﬁrms are also more likely to increase management efforts and contributions to local
communities in areas that are beyond the regulatory and business interests of the ﬁrm. Another result is that conditional on
exporting, ﬁrms that export to China engage in signiﬁcantly less CSR activities than ﬁrms exporting to other destinations.
Finally, we do not ﬁnd indirect CSR spill overs from trade. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides literature review and framing, while Section 3 presents
the data, deﬁnes the measures of CSR practices used, and describes the measures of trade through which we propose the
CSR transmission takes place. Section 4 outlines the empirical approach. Section 5 offers results, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
Exporting output or importing inputs can potentially enhance the productive capacity of domestic ﬁrms. Engaging in
export markets has been associated with learning and eﬃciency gains ( Van Biesebroeck, 2005; De Loecker, 2007; Blalock and
Gertler, 2008; Lileeva and Treﬂer, 2010; Cruz et al., 2017; Newman et al., 2017 ), research and development ( Aw et al., 2007,
2011 ), and innovation ( Puga and Treﬂer, 2010 ). Similarly, importing inputs has been linked with productivity gains ( Amiti and
Konings, 2007; Fernandes, 2007; Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008; Newman et al., 2016a ). The main mechanism proposed so far
in the literature to explain the association between productivity and engagement with global markets is that technology and
learning are transmitted through the supply chain. In this paper, we propose that engaging with international customers,
be they ﬁrms or ﬁnal goods consumers, and with international suppliers, may encourage the transfer of other types of
behaviour to domestic producers in the form of CSR. 1 See the following studies focused on social, legal, or institutional pressures and expectations that motivate ﬁrms to adopt socially responsible practices 
( Baron, 2001; Delmas and Toffel, 2004; Matten and Moon, 2008; Gond et al., 2011 ) and several which consider corporate strategic interests in implementing 
CSR initiatives ( Carroll, 1979; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Orlitzky et al., 2011 ). 
2 In addition, the Fair Labour Association focuses especially on the apparel and footwear sector in a project that aims to improve work conditions and 
social compliance programmes in 50 garment factories ( FLA, 2012 ). 
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 In its broadest sense, CSR refers to the creation of public ‘goods’ or the curtailment of public ‘bads’ by ﬁrms ( Besley and
Ghatak, 20 07 ). According to ISO 260 0 0 ( ISO, 2012 ), a guideline on social responsibility of organisations, CSR is deﬁned as
the: 
‘…responsibility of an organisation for the impacts of its decisions and activities on society and the environment,
through transparent and ethical behaviour that contributes to sustainable development, including health and welfare
of society; takes into account expectations of stakeholders; is in compliance with applicable law and consistent with
international norms of behaviour; and is integrated throughout and practiced in an organisation’s relationships.’ 
The deﬁnition proposed by ISO 260 0 0 resonates with Schwartz and Carroll (2003) , who identify CSR as a mix of eco-
nomic, legal, and ethical responsibilities of businesses. 3 The UN Global Compact also considers compliance with laws and
regulations including, for example, labour conditions and anti-corrupt behaviour an integral part of CSR ( UN, 2013 ). 4 Newer
deﬁnitions assume the economic component is given, referring to CSR as what ﬁrms do to further the social good beyond
the immediate ﬁnancial interests of the ﬁrm ( McWilliams and Siegel, 2001 ). To illustrate, paying for health or education
services in the local community furthers the social good and may not be in the immediate interest of the ﬁrm. Other types
of CSR activity may beneﬁt both society and the ﬁrm. Adherence to environmental standards is good for society and may
also be good for business. 
Firms can be motivated to engage in CSR practices to improve proﬁts and for altruistic reasons ( Kitzmueller and
Shimshack, 2012 ). Porter and van der Linde (1995) highlight that economic performance can improve with the adoption of
environment-friendly measures. Further studies have shown that CSR can increase ﬁrm proﬁts by decreasing costs ( Husted
and de Jesus Salazar, 2006 ), differentiating products, and charging a price premium ( Baron, 2001; McWilliams and Siegel,
2001 ), or by introducing technological and managerial innovations ( Kanter, 1999 ). It is also possible that ﬁrm owners, man-
agers, or shareholders proactively initiate CSR activities based on their personal preferences and interests, sacriﬁcing proﬁts
to fulﬁl a broader social interest ( Reinhardt et al., 2008 ). In other words, there may be an altruistic (not-for-proﬁt) motiva-
tion to engage in CSR activities ( Husted and de Jesus Salazar, 2006 ). 
According to Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) , the intersection of external and internal preferences reveals whether the
CSR activities are strategic or altruistic. They propose that strategic CSR arises as a combination of internal proﬁt-maximising
and external social preferences. When both external and internal preferences are social in nature, the resulting type of CSR
is altruistic. 5 We propose that international trade is an important external driver of CSR activities, emerging through inter-
actions between ﬁrms and stakeholders, which include consumers, suppliers, regulators, and activists. 6 Demand-side pres-
sures for CSR come from consumers, who derive higher utility by purchasing from ﬁrms with advanced social considerations
( Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012 ). 
Similarly, supplier pressure has been found to be important for the adoption of environmental certiﬁcation for ﬁrms with
a skilled work force ( Albornoz et al., 2014 ). Regulators may sanction ﬁrms whose production has negative environmental
or social externalities, so ﬁrms tend to adopt CSR to avoid paying ﬁnes. Furthermore, ﬁrms can undertake speciﬁc CSR
actions to protect themselves from potential negative publicity associated with social activism ( Baron, 2001 ). Corbett and
Kirsch (2001) assert that countries with strong environment-friendly attitudes create social pressure for managers to adopt
environmental standards. 
Globalisation, increased international integration, and trade have expanded the range of stakeholders to whom ﬁrms
are responsible. When a ﬁrm enters export markets, its stakeholders change from domestic customers and government to
include foreign customers and destination country governments. 7 Similarly, if a ﬁrm begins importing inputs, the range of
stakeholders expands to foreign suppliers and source-country governments. Firms that are part of an integrated supply chain
may have no choice but to adhere to higher standards of production. 
Accordingly, increased engagement in global markets is likely to affect the CSR practices of ﬁrms through these mech-
anisms if ﬁrms care about the preferences of their stakeholders in terms of CSR, and assuming the preferences of foreign3 This three-domain approach is derived from Carroll’s four domains of corporate social responsibility, see ( Carroll, 1979 ) and the Pyramid of CSR ( Carroll, 
1991 ). 
4 Note that in some deﬁnitions, CSR refers to ﬁrm activities that go beyond the law in integrating social, environmental, ethical, and consumer concerns 
into their business operations to create shared value for shareholders and stakeholders ( McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; Crifo and 
Forget, 2015 ). Societal expectations are that ﬁrms realise their economic objectives within the legal framework ( Carroll, 1979 ). While this is often taken as 
given in advanced economies, it may not be the case in developing countries. A case in point includes situations where the rule of law is not enforced to 
the extent expected from foreign stakeholders (see, e.g. Barrett et al., 2002 ). 
5 We do not have direct information (e.g. from managers) on the main internal motives for engaging in speciﬁc CSR activities. Without this information, 
we are unable to classify the types of CSR activities observed along the for- or not-for-proﬁt dimensions, and testing for how particular CSR activities affect 
proﬁt is beyond the scope of this paper. We investigate if the types of CSR activities observed (compliance, management and community) arise due to 
external factors, such as international trade. 
6 Investors may also motivate speciﬁc types of CSR activities, depending on their preferences ( Kolstad, 2016 ). Furthermore, Aldashev et al. (2015) show 
in a theoretical model that the pressure from non-governmental organisations for ﬁrms to act in socially responsible manner can trigger changes in the 
industry structure. 
7 Potoski and Prakash (2004) argue that if key export destinations adopt ISO 14000, pressures through trade linkages create incentives for ISO 140 0 0 
adoption. Herzfeld et al. (2011) ﬁnd that ﬁrms from developing countries, which trade with advanced European countries, are more likely to certify private 
standards, emphasizing destination country stakeholder preferences. 
C. Newman et al. / European Economic Review 101 (2018) 250–267 253 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 stakeholders are different to those of domestic customers, suppliers, and government. 8 The intensity of relations with for-
eign stakeholders may also play a role, implying that the adoption of CSR practices does not occur until a suﬃciently high
level of involvement with foreign stakeholders is achieved. 9 
Finally, CSR can arise as a spill over from trade. For example, domestic ﬁrms may observe and copy the CSR practices
of export ﬁrms in export-intensive sectors in the hope of entering export markets in the future. Equally, they may respond
to increased competition from imports by mimicking the standards applied to those goods to compete, or may be forced to
reduce investments in CSR as a reaction to increased competition. 10 
3. Data 
The data on which we rely come from several sources. The CSR information are from four rounds of the Vietnam Tech-
nology and Competitiveness Survey (TCS) through which we gathered detailed information on the CSR practices of a sample
of more than 4500 private domestic Vietnamese manufacturing enterprises annually between 2010 and 2013 ( CIEM, 2012,
2013, 2014, 2015 ). The TCS covered a representative sample of manufacturing ﬁrms contained in the larger Vietnam Enter-
prise Surveys (VES), administered annually by the General Statistical Oﬃce (GSO), and involving more than 50,0 0 0 manu-
facturing ﬁrms ( GSOV, 2016b ). While we focus the core part of our analysis on the balanced panel of 2546 ﬁrms, we also
present results for the unbalanced panel. 
Information on CSR is gathered along three main dimensions: labour conditions, management commitment, and com-
munity involvement. We also use the TCS survey instrument as source on the extent of engagement of ﬁrms with foreign
markets; while the VES provides balance sheet and other information on the activities of ﬁrms. The TCS Survey was ad-
ministered at the same time and under the same circumstances as the VES, which is mailed out to ﬁrms, which submit
the completed questionnaires by return post to the Provincial Statistics Oﬃce. Under the Law on Statistics, all ﬁrms are
legally required to comply. Any ﬁrms that do not respond are contacted by provincial authorities by mail, by phone, or
through face-to-face visits. All data gathered are checked by the GSO for internal consistency and crosschecked with the
administrative provincial data before being made available. 
We matched the TCS data for the sampled ﬁrms with information on the activities of ﬁrms and their ﬁnancial accounts
gathered using the main VES instrument, which produced a rich database which we make use of here. Finally, the values
of sector-level (4-digit) imports and exports are taken from the UN COMTRADE database available through World Integrated
Trade Solutions. 
3.1. CSR measures 
Following the Schwartz and Carroll (2003) CSR approach, the UN Global Compact (2013) and ISO 260 0 0 guidance for CSR
( ISO, 2012 ), we address several dimensions of socially responsible ﬁrm activities that can be internal to the ﬁrm or external
in the form of contributions to the local community. In constructing the CSR indicators, we cover, as noted, compliance CSR,
management-related CSR, and community-related CSR practices gathered in our specially designed survey instrument. 11 
Table 1 provides a description of each CSR indicator. The compliance CSR category follows the Schwartz and Carroll
(2003) legal domain of corporate responsibilities, which are deﬁned as ﬁrm responsiveness to society’s legal expectations
mandated through legal principles and jurisdictions. We focus on national labour regulation 12 measured using four indica-
tors that show whether: (i) all permanent employees have a written labour contract; (ii) the ﬁrm has a local trade union;
(iii) the ﬁrm pays social insurance; and (iv) the ﬁrm pays health insurance to employees. CSR management provisions mea-
sure the extent of management effort in going beyond regulatory compliance when assuring socially and environmentally
sound practices. This is a crucial component of CSR as interests of managers and directors may drive CSR ( Jensen, 2002 ). 
We measure CSR management requirements by observing whether a ﬁrm has: (i) a committee that oversees CSR prac-
tices; (ii) a written CSR policy; (iii) received CSR-type certiﬁcates; and (iv) whether the ﬁrm is a member of any groups that8 These mechanisms are supported by Gereﬃ et al. (2005) . They propose that in supply chains where buyers are concentrated (for example, retailers or 
brand-name companies) and suppliers remain fragmented (the so-called buyer-driven chains), requirements about products and production processes are 
passed backwards from buyers to suppliers. Similarly, in industries where the manufacturers are the most powerful actors in the supply chain (the so- 
called producer-driven chains, such as automotive industry, energy, and electronics), downstream ﬁrms are the recipients of speciﬁc product and conduct 
requirements. 
9 Perez-Batres et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the range of CSR activities depends on the intensiveness of the stakeholder pressures. 
10 There is evidence to suggest that ﬁrms are more likely to adopt environmental practices when local competitors have done so ( Zhu et al., 2012; Fikru, 
2014 ). 
11 There is no single best way of measuring CSR ( Crifo and Forget, 2015 ). See Turker (2009) for an overview of some methods for measuring CSR, as well 
as BCCCC (2011) and Gjølberg (2009) for different approaches. Earlier literature questions how well CSR metrics reﬂect CSR behaviours and performance 
( Chatterji et al. 2009 ). We rely on self-reported measures of CSR activities and acknowledge that some of the CSR activities included in our CSR index may 
not have direct implications for ﬁrm operations. For example, a written-down CSR policy may not be implemented in practice. We have, however, indicators 
that are expected to affect ﬁrm operations. For example, obtaining a CSR-type certiﬁcation is more objective as it implies changes in ﬁrm operations and 
requires veriﬁcation by a third party that speciﬁc requirements have been fulﬁlled. 
12 The dataset does not contain information on the compliance with domestic environmental or food safety and quality regulation, so the compliance CSR 
refers to labour standards only. Exporters are likely to comply with destination country regulations, which is usually demonstrated by obtaining certiﬁcates 
of compliance with international standards. Due to voluntary nature of such certiﬁcations, we include them in management, not compliance CSR. 
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Table 1 
Description of core variables. 
Variable name Description 
CSR measures 
CSR compliant Extent to which ﬁrm complies voluntarily with domestic labour regulation (4 indicators) 
CSR management Extent to which ﬁrm has a well-developed CSR strategy at the management level that goes beyond 
compliance with existing regulations (4 indicators) 
CSR community Extent to which ﬁrm engages in beyond compliance community-based activities not directly 
related to ﬁrm operations (8 indicators) 
CSR index Index based on all 16 indicators 
Firm-speciﬁc trade measures 
Exports output Dummy indicator for whether ﬁrm exports output 
Imports inputs Dummy indicator for whether ﬁrm imports inputs 
Export proportion Proportion of output exported 
Import proportion Proportion of inputs imported 
Sector-speciﬁc trade measures 
Exports into sector Value of exports in total sales of the 4-digit sector 
Imports into sector Value of imports in total sales of the 4-digit sector 
Exporter share 4-digit sector share of exporting ﬁrms 
Importer share 4-digit sector share of importing ﬁrms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 promote CSR standards. 13 CSR community provisions follow the Schwartz and Carroll (2003) ethical domain, which refers to
both domestic and global ethical responsibilities of businesses as expected by the general population and relevant stakehold-
ers. They measure the way in which ﬁrms contribute to the local community in areas that are beyond the business interests
of the ﬁrm. We measure the CSR community component in terms of ﬁrm activities related to: (i) environment protection;
(ii) education; (iii) infrastructure development; (iv) healthcare services; (v) youth programmes; (vi) poverty alleviation; (vii)
local heritage protection; and (viii) sporting events. 
For each category, we score ﬁrms by giving them a point for each of the CSR activities they practice. Combining the
scores across all three measures produces our CSR index that shows the overall amount of CSR activities by the ﬁrm (on
a scale of 0–16). The building components of the CSR index may not operate independently. Newman et al., (2016b) show
that there can be a high degree of overlap between certain activities. For example, ﬁrms carrying out management-related
CSR are more likely to engage in compliance CSR, while each of the community based CSR involvements are less linked to
other types of CSR. 14 
3.2. Measuring trade linkages 
Arguably, the transfer of CSR practices can occur directly through interactions with foreign markets, indirectly through
spill overs from import competition, or by mimicking the behaviour of ﬁrms within the same sector. We measure direct
connectedness to foreign markets with two dummy variables for whether a ﬁrm imports inputs or exports outputs. The
export and import intensity are measured by the shares of export or import in ﬁrm revenue. 
The sector variables used to capture spill overs are measures of within-sector foreign trade intensity. The extensive export
and import margins are captured by the share of exporting and importing ﬁrms in each 4-digit sector, respectively. The
intensive margins are measured, as the shares of the deﬂated value of exports and imports in sector total sales. For a brief
description of the indicators of trade considered see Table 1 . 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents a summary of the CSR practices of ﬁrms in the full TCS sample along with a summary of the trade
linkage indicators. We present the means for all surveyed ﬁrms (i.e. all ownership types) for the subset of domestic private
ﬁrms and for the subset of domestic private ﬁrms for which we have a balanced panel. The most prominent form of CSR
activity is compliance with labour regulations. This has the highest score with just below three out of the four possible
requirements fulﬁlled by ﬁrms on average. Private domestic ﬁrms have slightly lower scores than the full sample of ﬁrms
on the CSR compliance indicator. 
Management commitment to CSR shows that ﬁrms apply only slightly more than one out of the four possible activities
from this category. Again, private domestic ﬁrms have lower than average scores for CSR management. Firm contributions13 In the context of this study, management CSR should not be confounded with CSR arising from moral hazard. Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) explain 
that CSR can result from moral hazard when managers decide to invest in CSR at the expense of wealth creation. Analysing whether CSR activities affect 
ﬁrm performance is beyond the scope of this paper, so we interpret this CSR type as a dedication of ﬁrm leadership to CSR. 
14 Short of strong theoretical guidance on how to weigh different components of the CSR index, we a conduct principal component analysis. Using the 
ﬁrst principal component instead of the CSR index does not change the main results. The estimation results are available upon request. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics: ﬁrm-speciﬁc measures. 
All ﬁrms Private domestic ﬁrms Private domestic ﬁrms (balanced) 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2010 2011 2012 2013 2010 2011 2012 2013 
CSR measures (mean) 
CSR compliant 2.92 2.94 2.95 3.09 2.63 2.66 2.65 2.82 2.79 2.81 2.76 2.93 
CSR management 1.21 1.21 1.36 1.34 1.13 1.12 1.26 1.26 1.18 1.18 1.3 1.29 
CSR community 0.77 0.84 0.77 0.75 0.84 0.91 0.85 0.83 0.88 0.97 0.91 0.92 
CSR index 4.90 4.99 5.08 5.18 4.60 4.70 4.76 4.91 4.85 4.96 4.97 5.14 
Observations 6301 6463 5999 6073 4705 4798 4374 4465 2546 2546 2546 2546 
Linkage variables (%) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2009 2010 2011 2012 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Exports output 32.45 32.92 36.05 37.51 20.13 21.73 22.55 22.41 21.33 23.68 24.82 25.33 
Imports inputs 33.32 33.99 33.37 28.67 19.43 18.70 17.80 13.60 20.23 21.52 20.62 16.03 
Export proportion 11.64 24.30 23.80 24.18 7.10 14.46 14.25 13.62 7.58 15.78 15.53 15.26 
Import proportion 13.48 19.38 19.01 11.93 6.96 8.81 8.41 4.44 7.00 9.96 9.56 5.06 
Exporter share 4.31 14.07 16.16 14.78 3.98 12.77 14.28 12.89 4.03 12.75 14.36 13.07 
Importer share 14.23 14.28 21.22 18.66 12.81 12.51 19.39 16.79 12.9 12.69 19.36 16.87 
Exports into sector 5.86 5.44 4.07 4.63 5.66 5.42 3.71 4.51 4.81 6.62 3.74 5.31 
Imports into sector 14.06 12.00 6.21 6.67 16.88 13.98 6.84 7.69 11.69 20.17 8.46 9.25 
Observations 6009 6301 6463 5999 4432 4705 4798 4374 2546 2546 2546 2546 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data obtained from the Vietnam Technology and Competitiveness Survey ( CIEM, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 ). 
Note: Linkage variables enter the estimations in lags so we show 2009–2012 values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 to the community in which they operate are measured in eight dimensions. This is where we see the lowest level of en-
gagement in CSR activities, dropping to below one on a possible range of zero to eight. Compared to the sample average,
domestic private ﬁrms show a slightly higher level of community-related CSR activities. 
The average CSR index scores for all surveyed ﬁrms is around ﬁve (out of 16) and is slightly lower for private domestic
ﬁrms. With only every third ﬁrm engaged in one possible CSR practice, the overall adherence to CSR practices among ﬁrms
in Vietnam is low. The level of CSR overall is, however, increasing. This is due to compliant and management rather than
community CSR. 
Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the incidence of all 16 types of CSR activities deﬁned in Table 1 . As expected, ﬁrms
engage in compliance CSR more often than in voluntary CSR. Around three-quarters of ﬁrms provide social and health
insurance and around 95% of ﬁrms have written labour contracts for all employees. The share of ﬁrms with a local trade
union is just above 50%. According to the Trade Union Law of 1994 enterprises with 10 or more workers are required to
establish a local trade union. These local trade unions operate under the auspices of the Vietnam Confederation of Labour,
overseen by the Communist Party of Vietnam. In terms of beyond compliance indicators, around two-thirds of ﬁrms have a
CSR policy and around 10 per cent have some type of CSR certiﬁcation, such as ISO 14001, OHSAS 18001 and SA8000. 15 
The most common community-based activities are environmental protection and poverty alleviation. One in four ﬁrms
contribute to environmental protection and one in ﬁve to local poverty alleviation projects. Less than 10% of ﬁrms contribute
to educational programmes, for example, in the form of scholarships and infrastructure development. Other community
activities, such as youth support and local heritage protection are reported by less than ﬁve per cent of ﬁrms. Engagement
in different CSR activities has been stable in the observed period. A notable change has been the increase in social and
health insurance contributions and the committees that oversee CSR practices. Firms observed in all four time-periods show
a lower prevalence of trade unions and social and health insurance contributions and a higher prevalence of environmental
protection, education and poverty alleviation projects compared to unbalanced panel. Differences in other indicators are
very small. 
Examining the trade linkage variables that measure the engagement of Vietnamese ﬁrms with foreign markets, our data
show that around one-third of ﬁrms are engaged in foreign trade either through the purchase of inputs or through the sale
of outputs ( Table 2 ). While private domestic ﬁrms are less engaged with foreign markets, the extent of export engagement
is increasing. The sector share of importers is larger than the sector share of exporters. Likewise, the value of exports is
smaller than the value of imports in the sector. 16 
Summary statistics for the sector-speciﬁc measures of linkages with foreign ﬁrms and markets are presented in
Table 3. 17 We observe a lot of variation in the trade intensity of sectors. In 2012, the most export intensive sector was
sector 29 (motor vehicles), followed by sectors 16 (computer, electronic and optical products) and 21 (pharmaceuticals).15 These standards are usually accompanied by quality and safety management standards, such as ISO 9001 and HACCP. 
16 Summary statistics for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc control variables are provided in Table A of the online Appendix. 
17 In the empirical analysis, imports and exports are aggregated at the 4-digit level. They are presented here at the 2-digit level for ease of exposition. 
256 C. Newman et al. / European Economic Review 101 (2018) 250–267 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics: sector-speciﬁc measures. 
Proportion of exporters Proportion of importers 
VSIC sector 2009 2010 2011 2012 2009 2010 2011 2012 
10 Food 3.53 14.74 13.10 13.24 10.72 10.04 22.32 20.36 
11 Beverages 2.51 3.41 8.54 9.89 9.40 7.77 10.19 11.66 
13 Textiles 5.49 18.99 21.97 19.29 18.49 18.98 26.28 24.03 
14 Apparel 5.17 21.59 17.35 16.16 11.76 15.89 25.75 22.94 
15 Leather 8.31 29.46 14.57 12.64 22.57 26.22 17.87 14.70 
16 Wood 2.62 9.49 6.22 4.92 5.06 4.36 13.27 9.73 
17 Paper 2.58 9.39 13.90 12.35 11.49 10.76 17.84 15.43 
18 Printing 0.52 1.65 3.54 2.24 3.80 3.05 4.58 2.81 
20 Chemicals 5.70 14.62 26.31 21.75 22.60 22.07 28.51 24.25 
21 Pharmaceuticals 8.12 18.12 28.37 29.65 29.52 30.66 31.52 32.61 
22 Rubber 5.50 17.34 24.39 21.98 21.49 22.09 29.10 25.02 
23 Non-metallic minerals 3.34 7.69 9.07 7.89 10.12 7.70 13.20 11.06 
24 Basic metals 3.47 9.18 21.21 19.20 15.02 16.05 23.72 21.71 
25 Fabricated metal 2.12 7.66 11.07 10.49 10.36 10.09 13.16 11.63 
26 Electronics 7.94 29.95 46.60 35.12 23.36 36.67 48.37 38.59 
27 Electrical equipment 8.35 22.84 30.33 27.32 29.35 31.03 33.38 28.77 
28 Other machinery and equipment 2.46 9.10 17.74 17.33 17.57 16.47 20.44 17.98 
29 Motor vehicles 7.97 28.30 51.53 51.78 46.89 47.32 54.58 53.66 
30 Other transport equipment 4.14 16.90 28.26 27.88 29.77 25.24 30.96 30.20 
31 Furniture 8.28 18.95 14.98 12.51 14.74 14.07 21.50 18.28 
32 Other manufacturing 4.68 21.59 25.28 23.01 15.74 20.61 31.41 26.09 
Total 3.53 14.74 13.10 13.24 10.72 10.04 22.32 20.36 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Vietnam Technology and Competitiveness Survey ( CIEM, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 ). 
Note: VSIC stands for Vietnam Standard Industry Classiﬁcation, which follows the structure of International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation of All Economic 
Activities, Rev. 4. Sector 12 (Manufacture of tobacco products) and sector 19 (Manufacture of coke and reﬁned petroleum products) are excluded due to 
very few ﬁrms present in these sectors. Descriptive statistics for 2009 are included in the table as lags of these variables are used in the regression analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 These sectors were also the most import intensive. For most sectors, the proportion of ﬁrms that export/import has been
growing. This reﬂects the increased extent of global engagement of Vietnamese ﬁrms with world markets. 
Table A.2 in the Appendix shows average values of CSR indicators among exporting and importing ﬁrms for the full
sample, the subsample of domestic private ﬁrms and the balanced panel. Firms that do not trade internationally had lower
average scores for all types of CSR activities than exporters and importers throughout the observed period. The average CSR
index score is higher for importers, but the value of the index has grown more for the exporters in the observed period.
Importers have emphasised CSR compliant and management activities, while exporters have focused on community CSR.
Similarly, we ﬁnd that the CSR index increases with the proportion of inputs that are imported by ﬁrms but that a higher
share of ﬁnal goods that are exported does not guarantee more CSR (results not shown). 
4. Empirical approach 
The impact of trade on CSR practices is investigated through the estimation of Eq. (1) : 
CS R i jt = αi + β1 F i jt−1 + β2 S jt−1 + β3 X i jt + θ j + τt + e i jt (1) 
where i denotes ﬁrm, j sector and t the time-period. αi , θ i, and τ i are, respectively, ﬁrm, sector, and time ﬁxed effects. e i jt 
is the statistical noise term. The dependent variable, CSR ijt is the ﬁrm-level measure of engagement in CSR practices. We
consider four different CSR indicators: the overall CSR index, the compliant CSR index, the management CSR index, and the
community CSR index, constructed as described in Table 1 . 
Eq. (1) explains CSR behaviour as a function of ﬁrm- and sector-level exposure to foreign markets. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc
trade linkage variables are grouped in the vector F ijt -1 , while sector measures are captured in the vector S ijt -1 . Both are
included at a lag. 18 The vector X ijt comprises time-varying ﬁrm- and sector-speciﬁc control variables identiﬁed previously
as systematic determinants of the propensity to engage in CSR. We control for proﬁtability by including the proﬁt to assets
ratio and include the log value of value added, labour, and capital to capture differences between ﬁrms in size, visibility,
and the choice of technology. 19 These factors are likely to impact on the extent of engagement of ﬁrms with CSR activities
and participation in foreign markets making them important control variables. Campbell (2007) asserts that less proﬁtable
ﬁrms are less likely to engage in socially responsible practices as they have fewer resources to spare for such activities. 
We include the number of employees as our measure of enterprise size. Firm size has been found to affect positively
the decision of ﬁrms to engage in CSR practices ( McWilliams and Siegel, 2001 ). Moreover, larger ﬁrms may ﬁnd it easier18 We also have data for the sector- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables for previous rounds using the lagged variables, which do not involve any loss of observa- 
tions. 
19 We use the total assets of the ﬁrm as the measure of capital. All results are robust to the inclusion of ﬁxed assets as the capital control variable. 
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 to ﬁnance CSR-related activities, for example, to make the necessary adjustments in the production process to comply with
environmental regulation or investments in community projects. Value added is computed using data on proﬁts and wages
deﬂated using an annual GDP deﬂator. The proﬁt to assets ratio is the deﬂated value of gross proﬁts relative to the deﬂated
value of assets. Some types of production may call for more engagement in CSR practices ( McWilliams and Siegel, 2001 ).
For example, some ﬁrms may ﬁnd it more relevant for their speciﬁc type of production to certify internationally recognised
environmental standards such as ISO 14001 to demonstrate responsible environmental management. We control for the
technology in use by the value of capital. This is measured as the deﬂated value of the total assets of the ﬁrm at the end of
the year. 
We expect that larger, more eﬃcient, technologically advanced ﬁrms will be more likely to engage in more CSR activities
as measured by the CSR index, starting from compliance and management to community CSR. As is clear from Table A.1 in
the Appendix, ﬁrms tend to concentrate their CSR around the compliance activities. There is no reason to believe that ﬁrm
characteristics would have an impact on this component of CSR if the rule of law applies equally to everyone. The advantages
of ﬁrm size and eﬃciency would start to be observable in terms of management and community CSR activities, as larger
and more eﬃcient ﬁrms would have more human capital and ﬁnancial resources to devote to such activities. For example,
human resource constraints may be relevant for management CSR in small ﬁrms as they may not have suﬃciently qualiﬁed
personnel to develop a CSR policy. Less eﬃcient ﬁrms may not be able to achieve a ﬁnancial surplus which they can donate
to community projects such as infrastructure development. 
We also include a control variable that captures the level of concentration in a speciﬁc sector. The measure used for
this purpose is the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), deﬁned as the sum of the squared market shares within a sector.
Higher values of the index imply weaker competition and thus greater concentration in a speciﬁc sector. The market shares
are computed using the full dataset available from the VES based on the revenue data reported by each individual ﬁrm.
Competition can either increase or decrease CSR behaviour. Competitive sectors have higher rates of CSR adoption, but
when competition is extremely ﬁerce, ﬁrms may act in socially irresponsible ways to save money due to already meagre
proﬁt margins ( Shleifer, 2004; Campbell, 2007 ). Likewise, when competition is low, ﬁrms may lack incentives to engage in
socially responsible behaviour as a source of competitive advantage ( Porter and Kramer, 2002; Campbell, 2007 ). 20 
Identifying a causal relationship between trade linkages and CSR activity is challenging for several reasons. There may be
unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics inﬂuencing the CSR policy that are also correlated with the extent to which ﬁrms
are linked with foreign ﬁrms or international markets. For example, a manager of a ﬁrm may have international experience,
which could lead to more CSR and more foreign trade. Moreover, a ﬁrm’s position in the supply chain may make it more
likely to engage in both foreign trade and undertake more (or less) CSR activities. Firm-ﬁxed effects address this issue to
some extent given that they allow us to control directly for all time-invariant unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors, such as
manager characteristics and position in the supply chain. Sector-ﬁxed effects control for sector switchers, of which there
are many in Vietnam (around 7% of our sample), while time dummies control for general trends affecting all ﬁrms and
sectors. 21 
It is possible, even with this rich combination of ﬁxed effects and time-varying control variables, that other sources of
bias remain. For example, there may be omitted time-varying unobservable ﬁrm- and sector-speciﬁc factors that impact on
both the decision to trade internationally and CSR activities such as a change in management. Similarly, our model will not
control for time-varying sector speciﬁc shocks that impact on both sector-level trade and CSR such as a new sector-speciﬁc
regulation on environmental or labour standards. Consequently, standard OLS ﬁxed effects estimates will be biased. It is not
clear, however, what the direction of the bias will be. A change in management could lead a ﬁrm both to trade more and
to engage in more CSR in which case OLS estimates will have a positive bias. It may also be that new management reduces
the extent of CSR activities to direct investment into preparing products for export markets or purchasing imported inputs.
Similarly, a sector-speciﬁc change in regulations on CSR may force ﬁrms to engage in more CSR and divert investment away
from production-related activities important for participation in export markets. It may also lead ﬁrms to switch to imported
inputs to avoid having to comply with regulations. A second source of potential bias is simultaneity, which could arise if
exporting and importing are more likely to be associated with ﬁrms and sectors where ﬁrms are already socially responsible.
This means that the direction of causality may be diﬃcult to disentangle. 
To correct for these potential sources of omitted variable bias we rely on a two-step difference GMM estimator ( Arellano
and Bond, 1991 ). A ﬁrst difference transformation is used to eliminate the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed effect (as opposed to the ﬁxed
effects estimator) allowing earlier lags of the endogenous variables to be used as instruments. This implies that (assuming
no second order autocorrelation) the second lag (and earlier) of each of the ﬁrm and sector-speciﬁc variables are available
as instruments. We also use GMM-style instruments for the other ﬁrm-speciﬁc control variables for which the ﬁrst lag and20 Newman et al. (2016b) ﬁnd for Vietnamese manufacturing ﬁrms that CSR adoption is eﬃciency enhancing for ﬁrms, and even more so in uncompetitive 
sectors, suggesting that differentiating products through CSR may indeed be diﬃcult in highly competitive sectors while at the same time there may be 
incentives to engage in CSR in concentrated sectors. 
21 Firms switching sectors is a very common occurrence in the Vietnamese manufacturing sector and is indicative of the dynamic nature of the private 
sector. Newman et al. (2013) examine this phenomenon in detail. As such, even though the model includes ﬁrm-ﬁxed effects, which will absorb all time 
invariant sector-speciﬁc effects for non-switchers, we also include sector-ﬁxed effects to control for differences in sector-speciﬁc factors for ﬁrms that 
switch from one sector to another. 
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Table 4 
Variation in core variables over the 2010–13 period (balanced panel). 
2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 
Variable name 
Average 
change 
Percent 
increase 
Percent 
decrease 
Average 
change 
Percent 
increase 
Percent 
decrease 
Average 
change 
Percent 
increase 
Percent 
decrease 
CSR measures 
CSR compliant 0.024 4.78 4.65 −0.047 3.90 4.20 0.163 4.54 1.19 
CSR management −0.001 7.75 7.88 0.120 6.81 3.78 −0.004 4.74 5.11 
CSR community 0.085 7.11 5.79 −0.059 4.98 5.80 0.006 4.53 4.62 
CSR index 0.107 11.10 10.33 0.014 9.87 9.11 0.165 9.48 7.44 
2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013 
Linkage variables Percent 
start 
Percent 
stop 
Percent 
start 
Percent 
stop 
Percent 
start 
Percent 
stop 
Percent 
start 
Percent 
stop 
Exports output 8.4 6.0 5.9 4.8 3.2 2.7 2.5 2.5 
Imports inputs 7.8 6.5 3.6 4.5 2.9 7.5 2.9 3.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data obtained from the Vietnam Technology and Competitiveness Survey ( CIEM, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 ). 
Note: Number of ﬁrms: 2546. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 earlier are valid instruments. We provide more details on the exact lag structure and the validity of the instrument sets in
the results section. 
Using this approach, the parameters are identiﬁed using the within-ﬁrm variation in CSR and engagement with foreign
ﬁrms over time. Given the short time-series of our panel (2010–13) this limits the extent of variation that is used to identify
the parameters and may run the risk of weakly identiﬁed coeﬃcients. Moreover, the ﬁrst-difference speciﬁcation requires
that ﬁrms are present for at least two consecutive time periods. To avoid the possibility that parameter estimates are inﬂu-
enced by the exit and entry of ﬁrms rather than within-ﬁrm variations, we use a balanced panel of ﬁrms that are present in
every year for our main analysis and conduct robustness checks using the unbalanced panel. The extent of the within-ﬁrm
variation in the main variables of interest in the balanced panel is presented in Table 4 . 
There is a lot of within-ﬁrm variation in the CSR indicators between years. Around 10% of ﬁrms either increase or de-
crease their score annually. The variation in the import and export status of ﬁrms is much lower. On average around 5% of
ﬁrms enter or exit from export/import markets each year. We therefore expect the standard errors on these variables to be
large implying that any statistical signiﬁcance observed is a lower bound. 
5. Results 
Table 5 presents results of our analysis of the impact of trade on CSR. In panel A, the dependent variable is the aggregate
CSR index. We estimate Eq. (1) using OLS, a ﬁrm-ﬁxed effects estimator, and the difference GMM estimator. All models
include time dummies. Sector-ﬁxed effects and the control for industry concentration are included in the last column. In
column (1), we present the OLS estimates of the model, which links the indicators for whether a ﬁrm exports or imports
with CSR. We estimate this using the full sample available. In column (2), we restrict the sample to that which is available
for estimation using the more demanding difference GMM speciﬁcation for comparison purposes. 
Reassuringly, the coeﬃcients in columns (1) and (2) are quite similar suggesting a positive correlation between the export
of output and the level of CSR activity of the ﬁrm. The coeﬃcient on the indicator for importing imports is not statistically
signiﬁcant. In column (3), we move to a ﬁxed effects estimator, which controls for all ﬁrm-speciﬁc time-invariant hetero-
geneity. Unsurprisingly, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on the export indicator declines slightly. The coeﬃcient on the
indicator for ﬁrms that import inputs becomes statistically signiﬁcant suggesting a negative correlation between importing
inputs and CSR. 
As discussed in Section 3 , there are identiﬁcation challenges in inferring a causal relationship from these estimates. We
therefore use a difference GMM estimator whereby the model is estimated in ﬁrst differences and the import and export
variable are instrumented by their lags. Given that these variables enter the model in lags, the second lag and earlier are
suitable instruments. To avoid the problem of weak instruments, we restrict the instrument set to two lags. The results
are presented in column (4). Hansen’s test for the validity of the instruments is satisﬁed. 22 We ﬁnd the magnitude of the
effect of exporting on CSR increases substantially suggesting that OLS estimates are downward biased. The magnitude of
the coeﬃcient suggests that ﬁrms that export increase their CSR score by 2.46. Given that the average score is around
ﬁve, this is a meaningful effect, im plying 15% additional CSR activities after starting to export. Our results suggest that also
the coeﬃcient on imports is downward biased in OLS and it shifts from having a small negative effect using OLS (ﬁxed22 Strictly exogenous regressors include all control variables (labour, capital, value added, proﬁt-assets ratio and year dummies) in column (4), as well as 
HHI and sector dummies in columns (6)–(8)). We include two lags of all endogenous variables, apart from the once-lagged 4-digit sector share of importing 
ﬁrms as instruments. The underlying assumption for this approach is that conditional on the regressors, these variables are asymptotically uncorrelated 
with the error term. This is tested using the Hansen test for the validity of instrumental variables. All results are based on two-step estimations. 
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Table 5 
Impact of trade on the CSR engagement of private ﬁrms: extensive margin. 
Panel A: Aggregate CSR index 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Agg CSR index OLS OLS FE DIFF GMM DIFF GMM DIFF GMM 
L.output_export 0.192 ∗∗ 0.261 ∗∗∗ 0.175 ∗∗ 2.464 ∗∗∗ 2.332 ∗∗∗ 1.715 ∗∗
(0.083) (0.090) (0.076) (0.918) (0.849) (0.714) 
L.input_import 0.017 −0.003 −0.185 ∗∗ 0.915 ∗ 0.940 ∗ 0.936 ∗∗
(0.084) (0.094) (0.086) (0.496) (0.518) (0.431) 
L.sector share of exporters −1.148 −0.608 
(1.180) (0.951) 
L.sector share of importers −3.729 ∗ −2.597 
(2.195) (1.702) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies No No No No Yes Yes 
Concentration No No No No Yes Yes 
Balanced panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Number of ﬁrms 2546 2546 2546 4601 
Number of obs. 10,184 7638 7638 7638 7638 10,703 
AR test stat −2.48 −2.59 −2.60 
AR test p value 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Hansen test stat 0.81 3.76 3.07 
Panel B: Disaggregated CSR index – difference GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Compliant Compliant Management Management Community Community 
L.output export 0.836 ∗∗ 0.829 ∗∗ 0.512 0.4 4 4 1.086 ∗ 1.075 ∗
(0.373) (0.351) (0.346) (0.336) (0.607) (0.605) 
L.input import 0.542 ∗∗∗ 0.561 ∗∗∗ −0.062 −0.052 0.422 0.451 
(0.181) (0.185) (0.200) (0.214) (0.341) (0.354) 
L.sector share of exporters −0.515 0.141 −0.872 
(0.438) (0.467) (0.840) 
L.sector share of importers −1.352 ∗ −0.462 −1.985 
(0.782) (0.834) (1.587) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Concentration Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Balanced panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of ﬁrms 2546 2546 2546 2546 2546 2546 
Number of obs. 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 
AR test stat −0.90 −0.79 −4.16 −4.19 −2.12 −2.17 
AR test p value 0.37 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 
Hansen test stat 1.72 5.66 0.95 4.72 0.31 1.65 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data obtained from the Vietnam Technology and Competitiveness Survey ( CIEM, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 ), the Vietnam 
Enterprise Surveys (2012–15) ( GSOV, 2016b ), and the UN COMTRADE database ( WITS, 2016 ). 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level in parentheses. Each model also includes controls for output, capital, labour and proﬁt-assets ratio. 
Column (1) of Panel A presents results for the full sample of ﬁrms for comparison purposes. Columns (2) to (5) of Panel A and Panel B presents results 
for the sample of ﬁrms that are available for the difference GMM estimation procedure. Column (6) of Panel A presents results for the difference GMM 
estimation procedure for the unbalanced panel. Coeﬃcient estimates for market concentration (Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index) in columns (5) and (6) of 
Panel A, and all columns of Panel B, are not statistically different from zero. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 effects) to a positive and signiﬁcant effect when using difference GMM. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient suggests that ﬁrms
that import inputs increase their CSR score by 0.92. While lower in magnitude than the coeﬃcient on exports, this retains
economic signiﬁcance, implying 5% higher CSR engagement after starting to import. 
Firms from developing countries are likely to face liabilities of origin; that is, negative perceptions about their ability
to conduct their business responsibly. CSR has been found to be an effective strategy to overcome such liabilities ( Marano
et al., 2016 ). Consistent with the literature (see e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2010 ), our ﬁndings point to a greater inﬂuence of
customers than input suppliers on CSR activities. They also highlight differences in how CSR is practiced in the countries
of input producers compared with the export destination countries. Differences in CSR practices between countries are
attributed to economic development and national business systems ( Matten and Moon, 2008; Baughn et al., 2007; Chapple
and Moon, 2005, 2007 ). Lower levels of CSR are observed in Asia than Western counterparts, excepting Japan ( Chapple and
Moon, 2005 ). 
Table A.3 in the Appendix shows the changes in CSR after changing export or import status; more precisely, the pro-
portion of ﬁrms that increase CSR when they enter and reduce CSR when they exit export markets and the proportion of
ﬁrms that increase CSR when they start and reduce CSR when they stop importing. We observe both an increase in CSR
activities after starting to export and a decrease in CSR activities after stopping exporting. The increase in CSR activities
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 after becoming an exporter is larger (panel a) than the decrease after stopping exporting for all CSR activities, especially
for management CSR (panel c). We also observe that a very small share of ﬁrms (1%) increase CSR activities after stopping
exporting (panel b) and that the same share of ﬁrms decreases CSR activities after starting to export (panel d). The increase
in CSR activities after starting to export is about half a percentage point higher than the decrease (compare panels a and
d), while the decrease in CSR after stopping exporting is the same as the increase (panels b and c). In terms of importing,
the increase in CSR activities after starting to import is about the same as the decrease (compare panels e and h), while the
increase in CSR after stopping importing is about one percentage pointsmaller than the decrease (balanced sample, panels f
and g). These results combined may explain why we observe a positive effect from exporting and importing on CSR. 
In columns (5) and (6), we extend the model to consider indirect trade effects. These are the effects of the presence of
exporters and importers in the (4-digit) sector on the ﬁrm-level CSR score. We ﬁnd no evidence to suggest that there are
indirect CSR spill over effects associated with trade. 23 Our results are robust to the inclusion of 2-digit sector-level dummies
and the concentration control (column 5) and the use of the unbalanced panel (column 6). 
The results in Table A.4 of the Appendix show that the intensive margin of trade does not have a signiﬁcant impact on
CSR activities of ﬁrms. This points to more tangible CSR gains when starting to export than when expanding operations in
an already served country. CSR activities are, as noted, likely to change after changing the composition of stakeholders in
favour of those with greater preference for CSR. We ﬁnd evidence that this holds if a ﬁrm starts selling in foreign markets,
but not if a ﬁrm increases the intensity of supply in a speciﬁc foreign market. Expanding trade in a speciﬁc foreign market
could mean eventually facing clients with even stricter than the initial CSR requirements. Our analysis does not support this
claim. Instead it appears that preferences for CSR in individual foreign markets appear to have stayed homogenous in the
study period. 
The CSR practices may be affected by competition between workers for employment in ﬁrms with CSR (those that pro-
vide formal contracts, have trade unions, etc.). Firms could be, in turn, competing precisely for the workers that value the
CSR engagement by further increasing their CSR. To account for such a possibility, we introduce a control for revenue-
weighted average CSR practice of the competing ﬁrms in a speciﬁc sector. The results shown in Table A.5 in the Appendix
indicate that between-sector CSR spill overs motivated by the selection of workers do not appear to be relevant for CSR
adoption. Moreover, they do not appear to diminish the role of foreign trade in adopting CSR practices. 
Further, we check whether the observed effect from foreign trade is due to the ﬁrms that have started or stopped trading
in the observed period. The results based on the propensity score and nearest neighbour matching are shown in Table A.6 in
the Appendix. 24 First, the benchmark models in the ﬁrst and the second row show the results for the export and import
indicator variables. They conﬁrm the positive results of foreign trade from Table 5 . Second, we create indicator variables that
capture whether a ﬁrm has changed its export (import) status in the observed period. The results show a positive effect from
starting to export and starting to import, just like in Table 5 . While stopping exporting does not appear to matter for CSR
activities, stopping importing seems to have a negative effect. 
In Panel B of Table 5 , we estimate the difference GMM speciﬁcation separately for each of the components of the CSR
index. Each model is estimated using the full set of ﬁrm and sector control variables. The model is estimated using the
balanced panel. 25 As revealed in columns (1) and (2), the direct effect of trade on CSR is driven by compliant CSR, which
refers to labour market regulations. Exporting is associated with an increase of 0.83 points on this scale, which ranges from
1 to 4 (equivalent to 21%), while importing is associated with an increase of 0.56 (equivalent to 14%). There does not appear
to be any indirect effects of exporting on this CSR measure, while importing appears to have a negative spill over effect. 
Consistent with the results presented above, we expect that domestic ﬁrms, which are exposed to increased competition
from imports, will cut non-essential expenditure to be able to compete. It seems from these results that ﬁrms see compli-
ance CSR as a non-essential investment that can be cut as a competitive response to imports. This is consistent with the rent
dissipation effect of competition in a model presented by Bagnoli and Watts (2003) in which costs of providing public goods
harm ﬁrm proﬁtability more in competitive markets. Summarising evidence from several empirical studies on CSR, Crifo and
Forget (2015) ﬁnd, in contrast, that the relationship between competition and CSR is mostly positive. They do not exclude,
however, the possibility that competition drives down prices and incomes and so reduces the willingness of entrepreneurs
to invest in socially responsible actions (see also, Shleifer, 2004 ). This is what appears to be the case for Vietnam. 
Turning to management CSR, we do not ﬁnd any effect of direct or indirect trade, but we observe a positive effect of
export on community CSR. As revealed in column (6), the direct effect of exporting on community CSR is 1.1 points for an
indicator on a scale from 1 to 8, implying 7% higher community CSR engagement after starting to export. 
We do not, however, ﬁnd any indirect effects of exports or imports on community CSR. The positive effect of export
on community CSR could indicate that foreign buyers highly value activities related to local community, perhaps due to
better measurability and visibility of such actions (see, e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2010 ). In addition, earlier evidence shows23 It is also possible that the CSR practices of exporting ﬁrms spill over to other ﬁrms located nearby. Indeed, McCaig and Pavcnik (2014) ﬁnd that trade 
shocks are important for worker mobility in local labour markets between the formal and informal sector. We explored this possibility by including the 
proportion of ﬁrms that are exporters in the district in each speciﬁcation but it was not well determined. This suggests that CSR spill overs do not operate 
through this channel. 
24 A description of how the treatment effects are calculated and the balancing diagnostics are provided in the on-line Appendix. 
25 Using the unbalanced panel does not affect the overall story although some coeﬃcients on the ﬁrm-level export measure are not well determined. 
Results are available on request. 
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Table 6 
Impact of trade on CSR engagement of private ﬁrms: destination of exports. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Agg. CSR index Compliant Management Community 
L. export to China −0.322 ∗∗ −0.009 −0.130 ∗∗ −0.183 
(0.143) (0.052) (0.065) (0.119) 
L. export to US 0.164 −0.032 0.005 0.191 ∗
(0.128) (0.047) (0.065) (0.096) 
L. export to Europe 0.150 −0.006 0.058 0.098 
(0.123) (0.042) (0.062) (0.089) 
L. export to other Asia −0.015 −0.038 0.013 0.011 
(0.121) (0.038) (0.059) (0.088) 
Number of ﬁrms 878 878 878 878 
Number of obs. 2423 2423 2423 2423 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data obtained from the Vietnam Technology and Competitiveness Survey ( CIEM, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 ), the Vietnam Enterprise Surveys (2012–15) ( GSOV, 2016b ), and the UN COMTRADE database 
(WITS, 2016). 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level in parentheses. Each model conditions on a ﬁrm exporting 
output and includes controls for whether the ﬁrm also imports inputs, the level of output, capital, labour, proﬁt-assets 
ratio, sector-level concentration, ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, sector ﬁxed effects, and time dummies. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗
p < .01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 that ﬁrms enjoy the largest productivity effect from community-related CSR activities, such as participation in local poverty
alleviation programmes, community-based education and/or health programmes ( Newman et al., 2016b ). 
The ﬁnal part of our analysis examines the extent to which the destination of exports matters for the transmission
of improved CSR practices. In our survey, we ask ﬁrms to identify the three most important markets they export to. As
discussed, the mechanism we propose as underlying the effect of trade on CSR is that exporting changes the stakeholders
of the ﬁrm. If the preferences of stakeholders are heterogeneous across countries, we also expect the CSR effect to vary. 
In examining the correlation between the destination of exports and CSR, we condition on exporting and control for
whether the ﬁrm imports. We estimate a ﬁxed-effects model, which relates the CSR indices to dummy indicators for the
country/region the ﬁrm exports to. We consider four main export destinations: China, US, EU, and other Asian economies. 
Table A.7 of the Appendix presents summary statistics of the proportion of exporting ﬁrms that export their output to
these economies each year. The most important destination is other Asian countries (excluding China), followed by Europe
(excluding Eastern Europe), the US, and China. The proportion of ﬁrms exporting to China, the US, and Europe declined over
the sample period. The lower part of the table shows that ﬁrms are less likely to export to the US and especially to Europe
if they export to China. 
We estimate each model, including the full set of ﬁrm and sector control variables. 26 The results are presented in
Table 6 . We ﬁnd very little heterogeneity across export destination markets in the impact of exporting on CSR and our
coeﬃcients are not well determined. Two results that are marginally signiﬁcant emerge. 
First, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms that export to China engage in signiﬁcantly less CSR than ﬁrms exporting to other markets.
This holds for the aggregate index and is driven by the management CSR component. This index measures the commitment
of management and includes four different indicators showing whether: (i) the ﬁrm has a committee that oversees CSR
practices; (ii) the ﬁrm has a written CSR policy; (iii) the ﬁrm has received CSR-type certiﬁcates; and (iv) the ﬁrm is a
member of any groups that promote CSR standards. Our results show that ﬁrms exporting to China score 0.13 points (3%)
lower on this index than ﬁrms exporting to other destinations. It suggests that stakeholders in China were not as concerned
about the CSR practices of ﬁrms exporting goods into their market during the period under study. This is consistent with
earlier ﬁndings of unique characteristics of CSR as a management practice in China ( Moon and Shen, 2010 ) and recent
evidence of declining labour standards in Africa after increasing exports to China ( Adolph et al., 2017 ). Firms that only
export to China do not have levels of CSR that are different when compared to ﬁrms that only sell domestically, as shown
in Table A.8 (Panel A) in the Appendix. 
Second, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms that export to the US do more community CSR than other exporters. Again, this is suggestive
of the possibility that the export market may matter for the transmission of CSR engagement through this mechanism.
Export to other destinations, apart from China, results in more community CSR for ﬁrms that export to the Europe, as
shown in Table A.8 (Panel B) in the Appendix. This ﬁnding supports the existence of a sorting equilibrium along stakeholder
preferences were ﬁrms supply varying levels of the public good to different demand segments ( Kitzmuller, 2012 ). 26 We perform a similar analysis for importing ﬁrms, conditioning on whether the ﬁrm imports, and controlling for whether the ﬁrm exports. We do not 
ﬁnd any evidence that the source country of imported inputs matters for the transmission of CSR through this channel. Results are available on request. 
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 6. Conclusion 
This paper examined the direct and indirect effects of engagement with global markets on the socially responsible be-
haviour of domestic ﬁrms in Vietnam. Arguably, trade will impact on the CSR activities of ﬁrms through direct and indirect
channels. When a ﬁrm enters export markets or begins to import inputs, its stakeholder composition changes, making it
likely that trade will impact on CSR through this mechanism. Indirect effects from trade are also possible. Non-export ﬁrms
in export-intensive sectors may increase their engagement in CSR activities in preparation for entry into export markets in
the future. Similarly, non-import ﬁrms may reduce CSR activities to limit non-essential expenditures in the face of increased
competition. 
Using panel data on more than 4500 Vietnamese manufacturing ﬁrms for the period 2010–2013 (2546 in the balanced
panel), we explored the effect of trade on CSR. We found a strong positive effect of exporting outputs and importing inputs
on the CSR activities of domestic ﬁrms. This is driven by compliant CSR in the form of adherence to labour standards and
regulations, as well as local community activities beyond the immediate ﬁnancial interest of the ﬁrms. We ﬁnd no evidence
of spill overs to non-export and non-import ﬁrms. 
In relation to exporting we found that the destination country of exports matters. Conditional on exporting, exporters to
China engage in signiﬁcantly less CSR than exporters to other countries, while exporters to the US appear to engage in more
community CSR. This is suggestive of differences in the preferences of stakeholders in these markets. 
Overall, our paper offers evidence that CSR is strongly related to trade and thus may involve a so far overlooked effect
associated with international trade. This externality may provide a further justiﬁcation for policies that encourage increased
integration of domestic ﬁrms with global markets. Firms that import inputs or export output are in general more likely to
pursue CSR activities. This means that policies that facilitate engagement with global markets will not only beneﬁt the ﬁrms
involved in terms of productivity and proﬁts, they will also have knock-on effects to the beneﬁt of society more broadly. 
Acknowledgements 
The authors are grateful for collaboration with staff at the Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM) and the
General Statistics Oﬃce (GSO) in Hanoi, Vietnam. Our thanks to participants at various conferences and seminars. We also
highly appreciate expert comments and constructive critique by two referees and an associate editor. They helped sharpen
our focus and contributed to a much stronger paper. This research was carried out under UNU-WIDER’s project on Structural
Transformation and Inclusive Growth in Viet Nam. The usual caveats apply. 
Appendix A Table A1 
Summary statistics for all Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) indicators. 
Full sample Balanced sample 
CSR indicator 2010 (%) 2011 (%) 2012 (%) 2013 (%) 2010 (%) 2011 (%) 2012 (%) 2013 (%) 
Compliance 
1. All permanent employees have a 
written labour contract 
100 a 93.7 95.8 94.3 100 92.9 38.6 94.3 
2. Enterprise has a local/plant-level 
trade union 
48.4 51.5 51.4 56.0 28.9 32.5 70 36.9 
3. Enterprise pays contribution to 
social insurance for employees 
71.3 74.1 73.9 79.4 55.8 58.9 1.7 64.9 
4. Enterprise pays contribution to 
health insurance for employees 
72.1 74.4 74.0 79.3 57.0 59.4 6.1 65.1 
Management 
1. Has committee/board overseeing CSR 
practices 
35.7 36.4 47.8 45.3 30.7 29.7 94.2 38.5 
2. Has written down CSR policy 72.1 72.1 74.8 76.0 68.9 67.7 30.2 69.5 
3. Member of groups or has 
agreements that promote CSR 
standards 
2.6 2.4 3.4 2.1 2.1 1.3 57.5 1.0 
4. Has been awarded CSR type 
certiﬁcations or awards 
10.5 10.4 9.8 10.6 5.8 5.9 57.6 6.4 
( continued on next page ) 
C. Newman et al. / European Economic Review 101 (2018) 250–267 263 
Table A1 ( continued ) 
Full sample Balanced sample 
CSR indicator 2010 (%) 2011 (%) 2012 (%) 2013 (%) 2010 (%) 2011 (%) 2012 (%) 2013 (%) 
Community 
1. Environmental protection 25.8 27.1 24.7 23.8 27.5 29.3 23.9 24.5 
2. Education 7.7 9.0 8.6 8.6 6.7 10.2 8.2 8.3 
3. Infrastructure development 8.0 8.1 7.3 7.4 7.0 8.5 6.8 8.1 
4. Healthcare services 4.7 5.1 5.0 4.5 4.0 5.1 4.2 4.2 
5. Youth development 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.4 4.3 4.3 3.3 3.8 
6. Poverty alleviation 19.9 22.0 19.8 18.8 20.9 24.4 18.6 19.4 
7. Local heritage 3.0 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.8 4.1 3.5 4.5 
8. Sporting events 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.6 4.6 5.7 5.1 5.5 
Number of observations 6301 6463 5999 6073 2546 2546 2546 2546 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data obtained from the Vietnam Technology and Competitiveness Survey ( CIEM, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 ). 
Note: a The question about labour contracts was asked differently in 2010. 
Table A2 
CSR activities among exporters and importers. 
All ﬁrms Private domestic ﬁrms Private domestic ﬁrms (balanced) 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2010 2011 2012 2013 2010 2011 2012 2013 
(a) Exporters 
CSR compliant 3.53 3.57 3.63 3.70 3.25 3.34 3.41 3.50 3.36 3.44 3.49 3.59 
CSR management 1.39 1.42 1.59 1.54 1.32 1.35 1.52 1.47 1.34 1.4 1.56 1.51 
CSR community 0.75 0.75 0.69 0.67 0.96 0.99 0.95 0.92 1.01 1.13 1.03 1.00 
CSR index 5.67 5.75 5.91 5.92 5.53 5.68 5.88 5.90 5.71 5.97 6.08 6.1 
Observations 2074 2330 2250 2245 1026 1082 980 985 603 632 645 645 
(b) Importers 
CSR compliant 3.68 3.67 3.71 3.74 3.53 3.52 3.56 3.52 3.61 3.6 3.61 3.69 
CSR management 1.45 1.47 1.63 1.59 1.43 1.4 1.56 1.54 1.43 1.43 1.62 1.62 
CSR community 0.67 0.68 0.63 0.61 0.90 0.90 0.87 0.83 0.93 0.95 0.91 0.98 
CSR Index 5.80 5.81 5.98 5.94 5.86 5.82 5.98 5.89 5.96 5.98 6.13 6.29 
observations 2142 2157 1720 1801 874 854 595 675 548 525 408 403 
(c) No foreign trade 
CSR compliant 2.41 2.42 2.42 2.62 2.33 2.36 2.35 2.55 2.46 2.48 2.43 2.62 
CSR management 1.07 1.05 1.19 1.18 1.04 1.03 1.16 1.16 1.09 1.08 1.19 1.19 
CSR community 0.81 0.90 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.89 0.82 0.81 0.85 0.92 0.87 0.87 
CSR index 4.29 4.38 4.44 4.62 4.18 4.28 4.34 4.53 4.41 4.48 4.48 4.68 
Observations 3434 3527 3334 3333 3242 3337 3142 3138 1675 1683 1738 1732 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Vietnam Technology and Competitiveness Survey ( CIEM, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 ). 
Table A.3 
Changes in CSR after changing the export or import status. 
Full sample Balanced 
2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 Average 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 Average 
Non-exporting to exporting 6.73 3.42 2.59 4.30 5.89 3.22 2.47 3.86 
Exporting to non-exporting 4.02 2.73 2.45 3.09 4.75 2.71 2.47 3.31 
(a) Increase in CSR after changing from non-exporting to exporting (%) 
CSR compliant 1.27 0.50 0.56 0.79 1.26 0.47 0.43 0.72 
CSR management 2.20 1.22 0.54 1.34 1.81 1.14 0.67 1.20 
CSR community 1.58 0.65 0.48 0.92 1.65 0.59 0.59 0.94 
CSR index 2.92 1.42 0.91 1.78 2.51 1.30 1.02 1.61 
(b) Increase in CSR after changing from exporting to non-exporting (%) 
CSR Compliant 0.96 0.27 0.10 0.45 0.86 0.27 0.08 0.41 
CSR Management 1.47 0.30 0.56 0.79 1.22 0.43 0.43 0.69 
CSR Community 0.90 0.73 0.54 0.73 0.86 0.79 0.51 0.72 
CSR Index 1.69 0.82 0.79 1.11 1.49 0.94 0.71 1.05 
(c) Decrease in CSR after changing from exporting to non-exporting (%) 
CSR compliant 0.62 0.57 0.12 0.44 0.55 0.55 0.20 0.43 
CSR management 1.05 0.47 0.64 0.73 1.18 0.39 0.59 0.72 
CSR community 0.71 0.65 0.54 0.64 1.06 0.59 0.43 0.69 
CSR index 1.33 1.00 0.91 1.08 1.49 1.10 0.75 1.11 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table A.3 ( continued ) 
Full sample Balanced 
2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 Average 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 Average 
(d) Decrease in CSR after changing from non-exporting to exporting (%) 
CSR compliant 0.71 0.32 0.36 0.47 0.82 0.35 0.43 0.54 
CSR management 1.10 0.68 0.33 0.71 1.10 0.51 0.35 0.65 
CSR community 0.91 0.53 0.30 0.59 0.90 0.59 0.47 0.65 
CSR index 1.49 0.93 0.61 1.02 1.41 1.02 0.82 1.09 
Not importing to importing 3.57 2.73 3.29 3.21 3.57 2.87 2.87 3.10 
Importing to not importing 4.13 8.78 3.29 5.36 4.48 7.46 3.06 5.00 
(e) Increase in CSR after changing from not importing to importing (%) 
CSR compliant 0.77 0.43 0.40 0.54 0.79 0.43 0.35 0.52 
CSR management 1.28 0.85 0.54 0.90 1.22 0.75 0.63 0.86 
CSR community 0.76 0.57 0.72 0.69 0.75 0.55 0.82 0.71 
CSR index 1.58 1.08 1.02 1.24 1.53 1.02 1.14 1.23 
(f) Increase in CSR after changing from importing to not importing (%) 
CSR compliant 0.43 0.35 0.18 0.32 0.47 0.27 0.08 0.27 
CSR management 0.82 0.37 0.63 0.61 0.82 0.43 0.43 0.56 
CSR community 0.71 0.6 0.63 0.65 0.75 0.63 0.63 0.67 
CSR index 0.96 0.7 1.00 0.89 0.98 0.67 0.79 0.81 
(g) Decrease in CSR after changing from importing to not importing (%) 
CSR compliant 0.96 0.95 0.10 0.67 1.06 0.9 0.16 0.71 
CSR management 1.41 1.30 0.69 1.14 1.81 1.02 0.71 1.18 
CSR community 0.91 1.45 0.54 0.97 1.18 1.34 0.63 1.05 
CSR index 1.75 2.33 0.94 1.67 2.16 2.04 0.98 1.73 
(h) Decrease in CSR after changing from not importing to importing (%) 
CSR compliant 0.57 0.88 0.48 0.64 0.55 0.82 0.43 0.60 
CSR management 0.96 1.58 0.48 1.00 0.90 1.30 0.31 0.84 
CSR community 0.9 1.15 0.72 0.92 0.82 1.06 0.59 0.82 
CSR index 1.21 2.25 1.07 1.50 1.14 1.85 0.82 1.27 
Observations 6463 5999 6073 18,535 2546 2546 2546 7638 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Vietnam Technology and Competitiveness Survey ( CIEM, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 ), the Vietnam Enterprise Surveys 
(2012–15) ( GSOV, 2016b ), and the UN COMTRADE database ( WITS, 2016 ). 
Table A4 
Impact of the intensive margin of trade on the CSR engagement of private ﬁrms. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent var: Agg CSR index OLS OLS FE DIFF GMM FE DIFF GMM DIFF GMM DIFF GMM 
L.output export proportion −0.001 −0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.041 0.0 0 0 0.053 0.051 0.038 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.033) (0.001) (0.038) (0.035) (0.029) 
L.input import proportion 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.003 −0.001 0.005 0.005 0.006 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
L.export share in sector sales 0.693 0.903 1.032 0.978 
(0.510) (0.743) (0.817) (0.814) 
L.import share in sector sales −0.608 ∗∗ −0.746 −0.802 −0.823 
(0.284) (0.702) (0.744) (0.741) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Concentration No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Balanced panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Number of ﬁrms 2546 2546 2546 2546 2546 4601 
Number of obs. 10,184 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 10,703 
AR test stat −2.50 0.48 0.51 −0.58 
AR test p value 0.01 0.63 0.61 0.56 
Hansen test stat 4.26 5.37 5.39 5.22 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data obtained from the Vietnam Technology and Competitiveness Survey ( CIEM, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 ), the Vietnam 
Enterprise Surveys (2012–15) ( GSOV, 2016b ), and the UN COMTRADE database ( WITS, 2016 ). 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level in parentheses. Each model also includes controls for output, capital, labour and proﬁt-assets 
ratio. Column (1) presents results for the full sample of ﬁrms for comparison purposes. All other columns present results for the sample of ﬁrms that are 
available for the difference GMM estimation procedure. Coeﬃcient estimates for market concentration (Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index) in columns (7) and 
(8) are not statistically different from zero. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. 
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Table A5 
Trade and CSR: accounting for sector spill overs between ﬁrms competing for similar workers. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent var: Agg CSR index OLS OLS FE DIFF GMM FE DIFF GMM DIFF GMM DIFF GMM 
L.output export 0.268 ∗∗∗ 0.286 ∗∗∗ 0.063 1.933 ∗∗ 0.066 3.121 ∗∗∗ 3.042 ∗∗∗ 1.925 ∗∗
(0.090) (0.100) (0.120) (0.972) (0.120) (1.130) (1.128) (0.833) 
L.input import −0.021 0.020 −0.126 0.871 ∗ −0.130 1.198 ∗∗ 1.213 ∗∗ 0.993 ∗∗
(0.093) (0.100) (0.108) (0.479) (0.108) (0.595) (0.599) (0.451) 
L.CSR competition −0.088 −0.108 ∗ 0.146 ∗∗ 0.681 0.148 ∗∗ 0.022 0.361 0.020 
(0.054) (0.058) (0.073) (0.442) (0.075) (0.541) (0.324) (0.323) 
L.sector share of exporters 0.122 −0.831 −0.754 −0.084 
(2.017) (1.596) (1.576) (1.365) 
L.sector share of importers 0.001 −4.673 ∗ −4.846 ∗ −2.598 
(1.639) (2.538) (2.584) (1.995) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Concentration No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Balanced panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Number of ﬁrms 2546 2546 2546 2546 2546 2546 2546 4601 
Number of obs. 7636 5090 5090 5090 5090 5090 5090 7467 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Vietnam Technology and Competitiveness Survey ( CIEM, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 ), the Vietnam 
Enterprise Surveys (2012–15) ( GSOV, 2016b ), and the UN COMTRADE database ( WITS, 2016 ). 
Note: Variable CSR competition shows revenue-weighted average CSR practice of the competing ﬁrms in a speciﬁc sector. 
Table A6 
Results for the matching estimators (propensity score matching (PSM) and nearest neighbour (NN) matching). 
PSM NN PSM NN 
Dependent var: Agg CSR index ATE ATET ATE ATET ATE ATET ATE ATET 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Exporting 0.733 ∗∗∗ 0.410 ∗∗∗ 1.064 ∗∗∗ 0.814 ∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.087) (0.097) (0.082) 
Importing 0.493 ∗∗∗ 0.127 0.985 ∗∗∗ 0.597 ∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.096) (0.088) (0.082) 
Starting to export 0.462 ∗∗∗ 0.112 0.587 ∗∗∗ 0.137 
(0.177) (0.147) (0.173) (0.144) 
Stopping exporting 0.127 −0.045 0.299 0.021 
(0.237) (0.146) (0.194) (0.156) 
Starting to import 0.577 ∗∗∗ 0.211 0.665 ∗∗∗ 0.154 
(0.131) (0.138) (0.186) (0.138) 
Stopping importing 0.061 −0.132 0.188 −0.228 ∗
(0.141) (0.118) (0.129) (0.123) 
N 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 7638 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Vietnam Technology and Competitiveness Survey ( CIEM, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 ), the 
Vietnam Enterprise Surveys (2012–15) ( GSOV, 2016b ), and the UN COMTRADE database ( WITS, 2016 ). 
Notes: Matching for ﬁve nearest neighbours. Robust standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level in parentheses. Each model con- 
trols for the level of output, capital, labour, proﬁt-assets ratio, sector-level concentration, foreign trade spill overs, ﬁrm ﬁxed 
effects, and time dummies. Industry dummies are not included for starting to (stopping) export(ing) or for starting to (stopping) 
import(ing) due to perfect prediction in some industries. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. 
Table A7 
Export destination. 
Variable name 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Per cent of exporting ﬁrms 
China 12.6 13.8 13.3 13.2 
US 25.4 27.2 27.1 26.4 
Europe 33.3 34.7 33.6 34.3 
Other Asia 42.1 44.8 44.2 43.7 
Exporting to China and other countries 
US 13.2 16.1 15.1 10.6 
Europe 10.5 14.9 11.6 17.6 
Other Asia 51.3 51.7 41.9 40.0 
Number of ﬁrms 603 632 645 645 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data obtained from the Vietnam 
Technology and Competitiveness Survey ( CIEM, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 ). 
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Table A8 
The effect of exporting to China. 
Panel A: The effect of exporting to China compared to non-exporting 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Agg. CSR index Compliant Management Community 
L.export to China vs. no export 0.022 0.072 −0.059 0.009 
(0.200) (0.095) (0.104) (0.152) 
Number of ﬁrms 2305 2305 2305 2305 
Number of obs. 8368 8368 8368 8368 
Panel B: The effect of exporting to China and other countries on CSR engagement 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Agg. CSR index Compliant Management Community 
L.export to US 0.502 −0.131 −0.016 0.649 
(0.510) (0.121) (0.180) (0.447) 
L.export to Europe 1.369 ∗∗ 0.077 0.007 1.285 ∗∗∗
(0.556) (0.212) (0.157) (0.447) 
L. export to other Asia 0.055 −0.201 ∗∗ 0.012 0.244 
(0.318) (0.100) (0.161) (0.218) 
Number of ﬁrms 176 176 176 176 
Number of obs. 334 334 334 334 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Vietnam Technology and Competitiveness Survey ( CIEM, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 ), the Vietnam Enterprise Surveys (2012–15) ( GSOV, 2016b ), and the UN COM- 
TRADE database ( WITS, 2016 ). 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level in parentheses. Each model conditions on 
a ﬁrm exporting output and includes controls for whether the ﬁrm also imports inputs, the level 
of output, capital, labour, proﬁt-assets ratio, sector-level concentration, foreign trade spill overs, ﬁrm 
ﬁxed effects, sector ﬁxed effects, and time dummies. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. 
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